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Kinship and Marriage in Massachusetts 
Public Employee Retirement Law: An 
Analysis of the Beneficiary Provisions, 
and Proposals for Change 
J ennifer Wriggins * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly observed that "the American family" is changing.1 
Many statutes enacted earlier in the twentieth century, as well as 
numerous employer--supplied benefits, were based on a picture of a 
family consisting ofa working father and a stay-at-home mother, together 
raising their children. 2 This picture, however, was never a completely 
* Attorney, Pressman &:. Kruskal, Cambridge, Massachusetts. I am grateful for 
the help ofMary Ann Case, Elyse Cherry, Susan Farnsworth, Lillian Gonzalez, David 
Hofstetter, Paul T. Hynes, Martha McCluskey,Jean A. Musiker, Sive Neilan, Barbara 
J. Phillips of the Massachusetts Public Employee Retirement Administration, Mark 
Russo of the Massachusetts State Retirement Board, Peter Sacks, Jane Schacter, 
Barbara]. Ware of the Massachusetts Public Employee Retirement Administration, 
Gretchen Van Ness, Evan Wolfson, and the editors of the New England Law Review. 
Mary L . Bonauto's assistance was invaluable. The views expressed herein are my 
own; I take full responsibility for any errors. 
1. Only One U.S. Family in Four is 'Traditional, • N.Y. TIMES, January 30, 1991, 
at A19. According to the article, in 1990 only 26% of American households were 
made up of a married couple and one or more children under eighteen. Id. See also 
BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 4-6, 20-21, 51-54 
(1986); Recognizing Non-Traditional Families, SPECIAL REP. SERIES ON WORK&:. FAMll..Y 
(BNA) No. 38 (Feb. 1991) [hereinafter BNA REPORT No. 38]; Craig A. Bowman & 
Blake M. Cornish, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social AnalysiS ofDom.estic Parl­
nership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164-65 (1992); Jerhold K. Footlick, What 
Happened to the Family?, NEWSWEEK. Special Issue, 1989, at 14. 
2. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 89C (1961) (Annuities to Certain Widows of 
Employees Killed, or Who Died from Injuries Received, In Line ofDuty). Many such 
statutes were struck down as unconstitutional in the 1970s as discriminatory on the 
basis of sex. For example, a statute providing that spouses of male members of the 
armed services were "dependents" for purposes of receiving military benefits, but 
spouses of female members were not "dependents" unless actually dependent on 
their wives for more than half their support, was held unconstitutional in Frontiero 
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accurate representation of reality, particularly for women who were not 
white.3 In recent years, recognition has grown that the image of the 
"traditional" American family does not match United States demograph­
ics4 and, consequently, that some of the laws based on this image 
operate unfairly when applied to those who live in "nontraditional" 
families:5 Over the last decade, the concept of extending certain 
employment benefits to "domestic partners"6 of employees in order to 
relieve some of these inequities has gained considerable ground in both 
the private and public sectors. 7 In spite of these advances, however, 
domestic partnership ordinances and programs have thus far failed to 
deal with inequities in existing retirement programs. 
A paradigmatic example of this unfair operation of laws, which has 
received scant public attention, is found in the beneficiary provisions of 
theMassachusetts Contributory Retirement System for Public Employees 
(retirement statute).8 The retirement statute is a critical arena in which 
to examine these issues because it governs the retirement of over 
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). A Social Security Act provision that awarded 
survivor's benefits to widows, but not to widowers responsible for dependent 
children, was struck down in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
3. BLACK WoMEN IN WHITE AMERICA 227-84 {Gerda Lerner ed, 1972);JUUE A. 
MATIHAEI, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 94-97, 133-36 {1982). 
4. BERGMANN, supra note 1, at 4-6, 20-21; DiE AMERICAN WOMAN 1990-1991: A 
STATUS REPORT 372-74, tbls. 10-12; 376 tbl. 14; 377 fig. 5; 378 tbl. 16; 380 fig. 6; 382 
fig. 7 (Sara E. Rix ed. 1990); MATIHAEI, supra note 3, at 279-93; Footlick, supra note 
1, at 16-17. 
5. See, e.g., BNA Report No. 38, supra note 1; Cornish, supra note 1, at 1165-86; 
Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace, 51 OHIO ST. 
LJ. 1067, 1068-69 (1990); David Link, The Tie That Binds: Recognizing Privacy and the 
Family Commitments ofSame.Sex Couples, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1055, 1057-58, 1079-80, 
1099, 1114-18 {1990); John Wofford & Charles Colbert, Sexual Orientation in the 
Workplace: The Strategic Challenge, in COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS MANAGEMENT, 
Summer 1993, at 15; Lisa Zimmer, Note, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 
12 CARDozo L. REV. 681, 681-84 (1990). See Massachusetts Governor Weld's Exec. 
Order No. 340, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 134, 145-46. 
6. While the phrase "domestic partner" has no single meaning, it is generally 
intended to apply to those in an emotionally committed, co-habitating, intimate, 
nonmarital relationship. See infra text accompanying notes 134-45. 
7. See, e.g., Cornish, supra note 1, at 1188-92; see Massachusetts Governor 
William F. Weld Executive Order No. 340 {1992); Boston Mayor Raymond L. Flynn 
Executive Order, Extension ofCertain Personnel Benefits (Feb. 12, 1993); CAMBRIDGE, 
MAss. MUN. CODE ch. 2, § 119 {1992); BROOKLINE, MAsS. DOMESTIC PARTNERS BY­
LAW (June 2, 1993); Labor Letter: A Special News Report on People and Their Jobs in 
Offices, Fields and Factories, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 25, 1994, at AI; DavidJ.Jefferson, Gay 
Employees Win Beneftts for Partners At More Corporations, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1994. 
at Cl, C5; see infra text accompanying notes 134-41. 
8. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 9, 12{2) (1992). See text accompanying notes 21-132. 
This article does not deal with private employers' retirement benefits, nor does it 
discuss public retiremen~ systems nationwide. Public employment retirementsystems 
in the other New England states are discussed infra at notes 14, 76, and 117. · 
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400,000 individuals in the Commonwealth, the largest number of 
individuals governed by any single retirement program in Massachu­
setts.9 Retirement programs are an extremely important part of an 
employee's compensation package, particularly in the context of public 
employment.10 Providing for employees during their retirement, and 
in some fashion for their dependents, is one of the common goals and 
characteristics of retirement plans.11 Employee benefits, including 
retirement benefits, as a whole average 30.4 percent of the total com­
pensation of public sector employees.12 Retirement savings make up 
approximately 7.6 percent of compensation for public sector em­
ployees.19 Unlike a private employer's retirement plan, however, 
Massachusetts's retirement statute is a manifestation of the legislative will 
and reflects public policy. Thus, any inequities found are more troubling 
than those that might be found in private retirement plans. Such 
inequities are also subject to greater public debate, and perhaps to 
change, than those of a private retirement system. 14 
Part ll of this article outlines the operation of the Massachusetts 
retirement statute, codified at Chapter 32 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws. The statute's beneficiary provisions, discussed in Part ill of this 
article, contain a rigid and limited list of relatives who may receive cer­
tain valuable benefits after an employee's death.15 These statutory 
provisions significantly restrict the opportunity ofpublic employees with 
9. Retirement Boards of the Commonwealth, (Retired State, County, and 
Municipal Employee's Association of Massachusetts, June 1992). See also Publ~ 
Employee Retirement Administration, REPORT FORniESTATE EMPLOYEES' CONTRIBUfO­
RY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 13 {1992} [hereinafter PERA REPORT]. 
10. See infra notes 12-13. 
11. jEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, ed., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS HANDBOOK 1-2, 1-6, 10-25, 
10-26, 10-27, 33-5 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE BENE.FI!S HANDBOOK]. 
12. EMPLOYMENT COST INDEXES AND LEVELS {BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS Sept. 
1993), at 101, tbl. 26 [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT COST INDEXES AND LEvELs]. 
13. Id. at 102, tbl. 27. See id. at 10-17, 89, 93-94. For private employment, 
employment benefits constituted 28.7% oftotal compensation as ofMarch 1993. Id. 
at 14, tbl. 11. For private employment, retirement savings made up only 2.9% of 
total compensation as of March 1993. Id. at 93, tbl. 18. 
14. Two New England states, Maine and Connecticut, have revised their public 
employee retirement statutes in ways which make them operate more equitably 
towards those in "nontraditional" families. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17953 
{West 1989) (amend. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-165(a)(2),(3) {West 1988); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-165a(c) (West 1988) {amend. 1983, P.A. 83-533, § 12). 
The public retirement statutes of the other New England states generally contain 
fewer of the types of limitations and inequities discussed in this article. See R.L GEN. 
LAws§§ 36-10-18. 36-10-19.1{b), 3&-10-21, 36-10-23,36-10-24 (1956); but see R.I. GEN. 
L. § 36-10-20 (1956); see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 100-A:9, 100-A:ll. 100-A:12 
(amended 1991 8c 1993), 100-A:13 (amended 1992). 100-A:13(a) {1990). See VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 464, 465, 468 (1985). But see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 100·A:8 
(1990). See infra no~es 76 & 117. 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 38-112. 
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relationships that fall beyond the law's traditionally recognized ties of 
blood and marriage to provide for those individuals for whom they are 
responsible after their deaths.16 
Part IV of this article examines several other provisions of the 
retirement statute, including those addressing accidental death benefits, 
in which the bright-line status ofmarriage is not the sole determinant on 
which entitlement to certain benefits tums.17 In various circumstances, 
the marital relationship's duration, nature, and status at the time of the 
employee's death are considered in a'lvarding certain benefits. Eligibility 
for these benefits turns on both strict rules and case-by-case determina­
tions as to the fairness and approgriateness ofproviding certain benefits 
to employees and their families. 8 Given this legislative concern with, 
and the precedent of examining, the duration, substance, and nature of 
individual employees' marriage relationships, it is inconsistent and 
unnecessary to deny benefits to survivors of employees who are not in 
legally recognized relationships, regardless of the duration, substance, 
and nature of those relationships.19 
PartV ofthe article examines several legislative options to further the 
goal ofbasic fairness to employees while protecting other interests ofthe 
system, and in conclusion recommends several specific changes.20 
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MASSACHUSETI'S PUBUC EMPLOYEE 
CONI'RIBUI'ORY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
A. The Basic Structure 
The retirement system is part of the benefits package offered to the 
vast majority of Massachusetts's full-time public employees.21 Estab­
lished in 1946, participation in the system is mandatory for employees 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 60-112. 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 113-32. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 113-32. The tension between bright-line 
rules and case-by-case determinations is of course not unique to the retirement 
statute, but recurs throughout law. See, e.g., KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TExT 19, 21-23 (3d ed 1972); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL 
SnmiES 15-17 (1987); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of]tuiicialDecision, 36 HARv. L. REv. 
940 {1923). 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 60-112, 132-33. For other discussion of the 
retirement statute, see, e.g., Maria C. Walsh, A judicial Guide to Labor andEmployment 
Law 314-36 (1990) [hereinafter judicial Guide]; Maureen Duval& Paul Todisco, Pen­
sionReserves Investment Management Board's Overview of theMassachusetts Public 
Employee Contributory Retirement Law (May 15, 1992) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Overview). 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 133-74. 
21. ' Judicial Guide, supra note 19, at 314. 
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who are eligible to parti.cipate.22 Depending on when the employee 
entered into public employment, thus becoming a "member" of the 
system,25 between five and eight percent of the employee•s gross 
paycheck is deducted from each member's f.aycheck as a mechanism for 
partially funding the retirement system. 4 Retirement is generally 
achieved after twenty years of creditable service. 25 
An individual's retirement allowance is based on a formula involving 
the employee•s age at retirement, years of service, the type of job the 
employee performed, and several other factors.26 The retirement allow­
ance consists of two parts. The annuity portion, based on the member•s 
own contributions from payroll deductions comprises roughly ten 
22. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 22(1)(b) (1992); Overview, supra note 19, at 1. 
23. 	 A "Member" in the context of the retirement statute is defined as: 
any employee included in the state employees' retirement system, in the 
teachers' retirement system or in any county, city, town, the Massachusetts 
Turnpike Authority, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, or the 
MassachusettsPortAuthority contributory retirementsystem, the Massachu­
setts Bay Transportation Authority police retirement system, the Blue Hills 
Regional Vocational school retirement system, the Minuteman Regional 
Vocational Technical SchoolDistrict Employees' retirem~tsystem, and the 
Greater Lawrence Sanitary District Employees' retirement system, 
established under the provisions of sections one to twenty-eight, inclusive, 
or under corresponding provisions or earlier laws, and if the context so 
requires, any member of any contributory retirement system established 
under the provisions of any special law. 
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 1 (1992). There are in fact 106 contributory retirement 
systems in the Commonwealth. PERA REPORT, supra note 9, at 19. The current 
retirement law gathers togethermany pre-existing statutes regulating public employee 
retirement systems. Bianchi v. Retirement Board ofSomerville, 359 Mass. 642, 647, 
270 N.E.2d 792, 795 {1971). For convenience, references in this article to public 
employees generally include any public employees covered by the retirement statute, 
Massachusetts General Law Chapter 32. The retirement statute defines "Board" as 
"the appropriate retirement board established under the provisions ofsection twenty 
having jurisdiction of any contributory retirement system established under the 
provisions of sections one to nventy-eight inclusive .. . . " MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 1 
(1992). 
24. MAss. GEN. L. cb. 32, § 22(1)(b) (1992); Overview, supra note 19, at 3. 
25. "Creditable service" is "all membership service, prior service and otherservice 
for which credit is allowable to any member under the provisions of sections one to 
twenty-eight inclusive." MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 1 (1992). Details as to the 
application of the term "creditable service" are found in MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 4 
(1992). Exceptions to this twenty year standard apply to members of the retirement 
system who began their state employment beforejanuary 1, 1978. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 
32, § 5 (1992). These members may retire at any time after age fifty-five regardless 
of the number of years served. See MASs. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 1, 4 (1992);judi&ial 
Guide, supra note 19, at 314. Members employed January 1, 1987 or thereafter, after 
reaching age fifty-five, can retire after ten years ofcreditable service. See MAss. GEN. 
L. ch. 32, § 5 (1992). 
26. See MAsS. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 5 (1992). 
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percent of the allowance.27 The second p~ or pension portion, 
comprises the remainin~ ninety percent, or so, provided by the 
governmental employer. The amount of retirement allowance also de­
pends on the type of allowance chosen by the employee.29 
Several provisions of the statute permit a member to designate a 
beneficiary to receive certain pa~ents after the member's death. As 
discussed in more detail below, 0 the statute gives members consider­
able, but not unlimited, control over the disposition both of their own 
contributions from payroll deductions and of interest on those 
contributions}n In contrast, members' control over the choice of 
beneficiary for their retirement allowance, which includes the much 
more valuable pension portion, is strictly limited.82 The retirement 
statute also includes various otherprovisions, discussed below, pertaining 
~o benefits that certain relatives may receive after a member's death.83 
27. Judicial Guide, supra note 19, at 314. "Annuity" is defmed as "payments 
dependent upon the continuance of life of any member and derived from his 
accumulated regular deductions or from his accumulated additional deductions, if 
any, or from both, as the case may be." MAss. GEN. L ch. 32, § 1 (1992). "Addi­
tional deductions" are amounts that a member can specify be deducted from his 
paycheck. Id. "Pension" is defined as "payments dependent upon the continuance 
of life of any member or beneficiary and derived from contributions made by the 
appropriate governmental unit." Id. "Retirement allowance" is defined as "the sum 
of the amount of the annuity and the amount of the pension provided for insections 
one to twenty-eight inclusive." Id. 
28. Judicial Guide, supra note 19, at 314. 
29. Section 12(2) contains three options for types of retirement allowances from 
which an employee can select one. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) (1992). See infra 
text and accompanying notes 50-65. 
30. See infra text accompanying notes 42, 46-49. 
31. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2)(c) (1992). See infra text accompanying notes 
40-41, 43-45, and chart accompanying notes 66-75. 
32. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Options (c), (d) (1992). See infra chart accom­
panying notes 66-75. An additional issue is that of health insurance for employees 
of the Commonwealth and their dependents. Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 
32A, § 5 provides that state employees are automatically entitled to receive health 
insurance. Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 32A. § 11 states that the surviving 
spouse or surviving dependent of an employee or retired employee of the 
Commonwealth may continue general health coverage. A "dependent" is defined 
as "an employee•s spouse, his unmarried children under nineteen years of age, and 
any child nineteen years of age or over who is mentally or physically incapable of 
earning his own living ...." MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32A, § 2(d) (1992). This issue, 
although it has been much discussed in the context of domestic partnerships, is 
beyond the scope of this article. See supra notes 5, 7, and infra notes 134-41. 
33. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 9(1), 12(2) Option (d), 12B (1992). See text 
accompanying notes 113-32. 
997 Summer, 1994] RETIREMENT LAW 
B. Funding ofthe REtirement System 
Although deductions from employees' wages are used partially to 
fund the retirement system, the system was not initially intended to be, 
nor is it, funded entirely from workers' contributions. !H The remainder 
of the system's obligations were left to be funded on a "pay-as-you-go" 
basis, meaning that appropriations must be made annually for payment 
of current benefits to retirees.35 Due to the large amount of liabilities 
for members' past service (unfunded liabilities), and the uncertainty of 
tax revenues from which to fund anticipated liabilities, the General 
Court orga:I!ized an investigation into the operation of the law in the 
early 1980s. 36 This investigation eventually resulted in the passage of 
several pieces of legislation aimed at streamlining the system and 
creating several reserve funds with the goal of eventually eliminating 
unfunded liabilities.87 
ffi. CHOICE OF BENEFICIARY PROVISIONS 
A. The Statutory Framework 
The distinction between a member's own contributions (the annuity), 
and the pension itself, which consists of contributions derived from the 
appropriate governmental unit, is critical to an understanding of the 
retirement system.sa A "retirement allowance" consists of the sum total 
of the member's annuity and pension.39 It is also useful to bear in 
mind the distinction between a member dying before reaching retire­
ment, and a member dying after reaching retirement. 
1. Dying Before Retirement 
If a member dies before retirement, one of two things can occur 
regarding his _or her benefits, assuming that no exceptions apply. First, 
if the member has chosen a beneficiary from a limited list of relatives,40 
a one-time immediate payment of two-thirds of the total retirement 
34. See Overview, supra note 19, at 3. 
35. !d. 
36. Id. 
37. !d.; MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 22, 23 (1992); see also PERA REPORT, supra note 
9, at 5. 
38. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 1 (1992). 
39. Id. 
40. Ifa m ember dies before retirement, without having chosen a beneficiary for 
the Member Survivor Allowance, the member's spouse may elect to receive the 
allowance in some circumstances. MAss. GEN. L . ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). 
This alternative way of obtaining the Member Survivor allowance is discussed in 
more detail at text accompanying notes 124-32. 
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allowance to which he or she would have been entitled had retirement 
taken place on the date of death will be paid to the chosen relative.41 
Alternatively, ifthe employee has chosen a beneficiary not on the limited 
list of relatives, only his or her contributions, together with accrued 
interest, can be paid to the non-relative beneficiary.42 The beneficiary 
under the first scenario, i.e., chosen from the statute's limited list, ·will 
generally receive a much greater payout than the beneficiary under the 
second option. 
Each of these two outcomes will be discussed in more detail. Under 
the first scenario, a member may nominate a beneficiary '·within a narrow 
list of relatives as a "Member Survivor." If the member dies before 
reaching retirement, the "Member Survivor" will get a payout equal to 
two-thirds of the total amount of the "Option (c)" retirement allowance 
to which the member would have been entitled had retirement taken 
place on the date of death.43 The Option (c) retirement allowance is 
one of several retirement allowance options from which members may 
choose upon their retirement.44 The only persons that a member may 
nominate to receive this Member Survivor Allowance are the member's 
"spouse[,] former spouse who has not remarried, child, father, mother, 
sister or brother . .. . "45 
Regarding the second scenario, the payment of a member's con­
tributions to a beneficiary, any member may nominate on a prescribed 
41. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). 
42. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2)(b}, (c) (1992). 
43. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2), Option (d) (1992). Note that the Member 
Survivor Allowance only applies if the employee dies before retirement. See infra 
chart accompanying notes 66-75. 
44. See infra text accompanying notes 56-65. 
45. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option {c) (1992). According to Option (c), 
if a spouse receiving an allowance as a beneficiary dies, leaving children of the 
beneficiary and the deceased employee who are under eighteen years of age, the 
children's guardian will receive the spouse's share. Id. The option further provides 
that if a member has not designated an eligible beneficiary other than his or her 
spouse under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 32, § 12{2) Option {c), with some 
conditions the spouse may elect to receive the Member Survivor Allowance, § 12{2) 
Option {d). If the spouse elects to receive the allowance, the spouse will receive an 
additional allo·wance for each minor, incapacitated, or under twenty-two year old 
student child. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12B (1992). If the spouse does not elect 
to receive the allowance, and prior to death the member had designated a beneficiary 
under the more liberal provisions of § 11(2)(c), then lhe accumulated total 
deductions of the member shall be given to the surviving beneficiary chosen under 
§ 11(2)(c). MAss. GEN. L. cb. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). If there is no other 
surviving beneficiary, the spouse shall receive the member's accumulated total 
deductions. Id. On a member's death, the board shall notify the spouse and 
children of the member what information is necessary to determine their eligibility 
for benefits. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(c) Option (d) (1992). Remarriage of the 
spouse reduces the Member Survivor l\llowance. ld. 
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form "one or more beneficiaries to receive" the return of the employee's 
contributions if he or she dies before retirement, according to the 
retirement statute's section 11(2). 46 The statute contains several 
exceptions to an employee's ability to nominate any person to receive his 
or her contributions. For example, if the deceased employee has 
nominated a beneficiary for part of the retirement allowance under the 
more limited provisions of section 12(2) Option (d) (Member Survivor 
Allowance),47 payment of the member's contributions to a beneficiary 
under section 11(2) shall not be made.48 Thus, a member cannot 
"split" retirement benefits by giving contributions to a non-relative and 
part of the pension to a relative. Another exception occurs when an em­
ployee is survived by a dependent child and payment is not made under 
the broad provisions of section 11(2)!9 Apart from these exceptions, 
an adult member may nominate whoever be or she wishes to receive his 
or her contributions upon death. 
2. Dying After Retirement 
A member who survives until the age of retirement and becomes 
eligible for retirement can retire and choose from three different options 
with respect to retirement benefits.50 Each option is tailored to 
advance different goals ofdifferent employees, and together they present 
a rather broad range of options for employees to choose from, 
depending on their family situations and ·wishes. For an individual who 
seeks to have the maximum amount ofincome during his or her life and 
has no person to whom he or she seeks to leave any benefits, Option (a), 
the "Life Annuity," is the obvious choice. It is a "full retirement 
46. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2)(c) (1992). This subsection also contains the 
proviso that "any such beneficiaries nominated by a minor shall be ofhis kindred." 
Id. § 11(2)(c). See infra chart accompanying notes 66-75. 
47. Id. § 12{2) Option (d). The list of possible beneficiaries for MAss. GEN. L. 
ch. 32, § 12(2) Options (c) and (d) is actually contained in Option (c). See infra text 
accompanying notes 124-32. 
48. MASs. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2)(c) (1992). In such an instance, return of 
contributions and interest would be made under the provisions of§ 12(2). 
49. Id. Specifically, if the deceased employee is a male and is survived by a 
person eligible to receive the pension allowance as set forth in § 12B (which provides 
for an additional allowance for spouses and children ofsurviving members), or is a 
female and is survived by a child eligible according to § 12B, the return of 
contributions to the designated beneficiary shall not be made. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 
32, § 11(2)(c) (1992). If"the widow" or guardian of the minor child chooses not to 
elect to receive the benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled, the benefits 
will be paid in accordance with the employee's choice. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, 
§ 11(2)(c) (1992). 
50. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(1) (1992). If a member lives to retireme.nt and 
dies without having chosen an option, the retirement allowance is paid as in § 12(2) 
Option (b) (1992). MASs. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(1) (1992). See infra notes 52-65 and 
accompanying text. See also infra chart accompanying notes 66-75. 
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allowance," including a pension, which does not provide payment to any 
beneficiaries.51 All payments are made during the member's life and 
terminate upon death. 
Option (b), the "Cash Refund Annuity," involves a member receiving 
a cash annuity consisting generally of employee contributions and a 
pension.52 But if the employee dies before the annuity portion 
disbursed equals the amount of contributions made, the beneficiary as 
designated in the permissive provisions of section 11(2)5s receives the 
balance of the member's contributions.54 If the employee dies after 
having received annuity payments which are greater than the amount of 
employee contributions, the beneficiary receives nothing.55 The benefi­
ciary does not under any circumstances receive the pension. 
The final choice, Option (c), is the "Joint and Last Survivor 
Allowance." This option is designed for persons who want to provide 
for a beneficiary as well as receive a retirement allowance. Under 
Option (c), a member gets a reduced retirement allowance during his or 
her lifetime.56 After the member's death, the eligible beneficiary 
receives two-thirds of the member's retirement allowance for the 
beneficiary's lifetime.57 
This "Joint and Last Survivor Allowance" is a very valuable benefit, 
but unlike the treatment of employee contributions made to the system, 
the employee is only allowed to designate a beneficiary from certain 
limited categories of people.58 Under this provision, as with the Mem­
ber Survivor Allowance discussed above,59 "[n]o person shall be eligible 
for nomination as beneficiary . . . unless such person is the spouse[,] 
former spouse who has not remarried, child, father, mother, sister or 
51. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (a) (1992). The life annuity is a full 
retirement allowance payable to such member which shall consist-of a regular life 
annuity, a pension, and an additional life annuity. Id. 
52. MAss GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (b) (1992). 
53. See supra notes 42, 46-49 and accompanying text. 
54. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (b) (1992). 
55. Id. 
56. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992); PERA REPORT, supra note 
9, at 23. 
57. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option {c) {1992). Once the member reaches 
retirement, the 12(c) beneficiary choice becomes irrevocable: if the beneficiary dies 
on or after the date the retirement allowance becomes effective, but before the death 
of the member, the member shall be paid a full retirement benefit under Option {a) 
and may not designate anyone else to receive the benefit. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, 
§ 12(2) Option (c) (1992). If, however, the beneficiary dies before the date the retire­
ment allowance becomes effective, the member may make a new election under 
Option (a), (b), or (c). Id. 
58. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992). 
59. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41, 43-45. 
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brother of such member."60 No person can be a member's Joint and 
Last Survivor other than one who falls '\vithin the categories of the 
spouse or immediate family. The Joint and Last Survivor Allowance is 
the only means by which an employee may provide an annual allowance 
for a named beneficiary. If an employee does not have a spouse, a 
former spouse who has not remarried, or a relative on the authorized list 
to whom he or she wants to bequeath these benefits, the employee must 
take either the Life Annuity option, 61 using the entire retirement bene­
fit, or the Cash Refund Annuity, 62 which allows an employee to give a 
portion of his or her contributions to a designee outside the retirement 
allowance beneficiary provisions of Option (c) if any contributions 
remain at the time of death.ss All of the three options included in 
section 12(2) are actuarially equivalent.64 This means that each is 
designed to cost the public employer the same amount65 
60. MAss. GEN. L. ch 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992). If a spouse receiving an 
allowance as a beneficiary dies leaving children of the deceased employee and the 
beneficiary who are under eighteen years ofage, the children's guardian will receive 
the member's share. Id. This list is hereinafter referred to as the "retirement 
allowance beneficiary" provisions. 
61. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12{2) Option (a) (1992). 
62. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (b) (1992). 
63. As allowed by MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2) {1992). 
64. MASs. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12 (2) Option (c) (1992). 
65. "Actuarial equivalent" is defined by the retirement statute as "any benefit of 
equal value when computed upon the basis of che Combined Annuity Table of 
Mortality set back one year and interest at the rate of three per cent [sic] per 
annum." MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 1 (1992). 
An additional definition of"actuarial equivalent" is, "[i]f the present value of two 
series of payments is equal, taldng into account a given interest rate and mortality 
according to a given table, the two series are said to be actuarially equivalent. For 
example, under a given set of actuarial assumptions, a lifetime monthly benefit of 
$67.60 beginning at age 60 can be said to be the actuarial equivalent of $100 a 
month beginning atage 65. The actual benefit amounts are differentbut the present 
value of the two benefits, considering mortality and interest. is che same." 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS: A GLOSSARY OF TERMS 3 (June M. LelunanJ ed., 6th ed 
1987). 
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TABLE I 

1. Death Occurs Before Retirement 
Type of Funds: Beneficiary Options: 
A. Member's Own Contributions plus 
interest66 
Emplo-ree's 
Choice67 
B. Two-Thirds of total retirement 
allowance to which member would have 
been entitled if retirement had taken 
place on date of death (Member-Survivor 
Allowance )68 
Spouse, former 
spouse who has not 
remarried, siblin~, 
children, parents 9 
2. Death Occurs After Retirement 
Options: 
(a) Life Annuity. Full pension plus 
annuity, received by member during 
lifetime70 
None71 
(b) Cash Refund Annuity. Cash annuity 
including annuity plus pension for 
member's lifetime; beneficiary receives 
balance of employee's contributions if 
employee dies before receiving annuity 
pa~ents greater than her contribu­
tions72 
Employee's choice78 
(c) Joint and Last Survivor. Reduced 
allowance during member's lifetime; 
beneficiary receives two-thirds of the 
member's retirement allowance during 
her lifetime74 
Spouse, former 
spouse who has not 
remarried, siblin~s, 
children, parents 5 
66. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11 (2)(a) (1992). 
67. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11 (2)(c) (1992). 
68. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12 (2) Option (d) (1992). 
69. MAss. GEN. L. cb. 32, § 12(2) Options (c), (d) (1992). 
70. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (a) (1992). 
71. MAss. GEN. L. cb. 32, § 12(2) Option (a) (1992). 
72. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (b) (1992). 
73. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 12(2) Option (b), 11(2) (1992). 
74. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992). 
75. MAss. GEN. L. cb. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992). 
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B. Implications of the Limitations on Choice ofBeneficiary 
The limitations on beneficiaries of the Joint and Last Survivor 
Allowance and the Member Survivor Allowance in certain respects 
deprive some deserving members of the right to control their benefits 
as opposed to other members.76 Employees are only allowed to retire 
after providing loyal service to the Commonwealth for many years. 77 
The retirement allowance, as well as the opportunity to name those 
closest to one as beneficiaries, are intended to constitute part of the 
reward for such loyal service. 
For example, if an unmarried, long-divorced, or never-married 
member has no living children, parents, or siblings, but does have an 
extremely close friend for whom he or she wishes to provide, under the 
present system the member is not permitted to name the friend as 
beneficiary of either the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance78 or the 
Member Survivor Allowance.79 The member may provide for a return 
of contributions to the friend if the employee dies before retirement. 80 
If the employee lives to retirement, he or she must choose between the 
Life Annuity Option81 and the Cash Refund Annuity.82 The Cash 
Refund Annuity allows for the return of a portion of the employee's 
contributions to the friend/beneficiary, depending on how long the 
member lives. If a member has a close friend and a living brother, 
however, the member is unable both to bequeath the contributions to 
the friend and name the brother as beneficiary of the Joint and Last 
Survivor Allowance. If the brother is named as the Joint and Last 
Survivor83 or Member Survivor84 beneficiary, the close friend cannot 
76. The public retirement statute of the other New England states contain fewer 
limitations on who an employee may choose to be a beneficiary of a · retirement 
allowance than Massachusetts. In fact, Vennont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and 
Maine have no limitations on whom an employee may designate for receipt of an 
allowance. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 468 Options 2, 3, 4 (1985); CoNN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 5-165 {a)(2), (3) (West 1988); N.H. REv. SrAT. ANN. § 100-A:13 Options 2, 3 . 
(1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17953(2) (West 1989). Rhode Island only 
requires that a recipient of a retirement allowance have an insurable interest in the 
employee's life. R.I. GEN. LAws § 36-10-18 (a), (b) (1990). 
77. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 5 (1992). Twenty years of creditable service is 
generally required before retirement is achieved. Judicial Guide, supra note 19, at314 
(citing MAss. GE.N. L. ch. 32, § 5 {1992)). See supra text accompanying note 25. 
78. MAss. GEN. L ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992). 
79. MAss. GEN. L ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). 
80. MAss. GEN. L ch. 32, § 11(2) (1992). 
81. MAss. GE.N. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (a) (1992). 
82. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option {b) (1992). 
83. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) OptiQn (c) (1992). 
84. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). 
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be named to receive the return ofemployee contributions under section 
11(2).85 
Another example is that oftwo unmarried individuals in a heterosex­
ual relationship who consider themselves to be spouses, live together, 
share their incomes, and name each other as beneficiaries in their wills. 
In such a scenario, the female member could not name her "spouse" as 
beneficiary of the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance or the Member 
Survivor Allowance. If she dies before retirement, the only way her 
partner can receive any ofher benefits or contributions only is ifshe had 
named him under section 11(2) as beneficiary of her contributions. If 
she dies after retirement, the only way he can receive any ofher benefits 
or contributions is if she had chosen the Cash Refund Annuity and dies 
prior to receiving an amount equal to the contributions she had made 
to the system. If the member dies before retirement, the "spouse" could 
not possibly elect to receive the Member Survivor Allowance, because 
non-spouses are not permitted to make such elections.86 
If the heterosexual couple married, the member would instantly be 
able to name her husband as Joint and Last Survivor and Member 
Survivor beneficiary. 87 If she dies before retirement and had neglected 
to name her husband or any other person as beneficiary, her husband 
could elect to receive the Member Survivor Allowance, assuming that the 
couple had been married a year and was living together at the time of 
her death.88 
An additional example is of two individuals in a homosexual 
relationship, who consider themselves to be spouses, live together, share 
support of each other, name each other as beneficiaries in their wills, 
and whose relationship shares many ofthe characteristics of a traditional 
marriage. A member ofthe retirement system in such a situation would 
have no way of providing for his or her partner with the Member 
Survivor Allowance or theJoint and Last Survivor Allowance, even ifthe 
partnerwas completely dependent on the member for financial support. 89 
85. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2)(c) (1992). 
86. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(d) (1992). 
87. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(c) (1992). 
88. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)( d) (1992). Also, the employee must have been 
a member for at least two years. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 124-32. 
89. It is illegal in Massachusetts for an employer, "because of the ... sexual 
orientation . . . of any individual . . . to discriminate against such individual in 
compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, unless based 
upon a bona fide occupational qualification." MAss. GEN. L. ch. 151B, § 4(1) (1992). 
Chapter 151B, section (4)(1) of the Massachusetts General Laws does not outlaw 
discrimination on the basis ofmarital status. It may be argued that the limitations 
in the retirement allowance beneficiary provisions effectively offer lower compensa­
tion and less favorable terms, conditions, and privileges of employment to gay and 
lesbian employees than to heterosexual employees. A heterosexual employee can 
marry her partner and thus may name his or her spouse (or former spouse) as a 
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retirement allowance beneficiary. By contrast, a gay or lesbian employee cannot 
marry his or her partner and is thus unable to provide the same benefits to the 
partner (or former partner). 
Participation in the system is mandatory for employees. An employee cannot set 
up an individual retirement account (for which he or she could choose any 
beneficiary) during any year when he or she is a member. I.RC. § 219(g) (1988). 
Thus, an employee's mandatory participation in the system affects retirement 
planning in a significant manner. 
The success of a discrimination claim is uncertain but possible. First, an ame­
ndment to several sections of Chapter 151B states: "[N]othing in this act shall be 
construed so as to legitimize or validate a 'homosexual marriage,• so-called, or to 
provide health insurance or related employee benefits to a 'homosexual spouse,' so­
called" 1989 Mass. Acts. ch. 516, § 19. This language has not been construed in any 
reported decisions. 
One issue in a discrimination case is likely to be whether a retirement allowance 
is an "employee benefit" which is "related" to "health insurance." Chapter 151B by 
its terms is to be construed liberally to accomplish its purposes, which include 
opposing clisaimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employmenL MAsS. 
GEN. L ch. 151B, § 9 (1992). The retirement statute operates largely independently 
of any provisions relating to state employees' health insurance. See supra note 32. 
Moreover, many employers provide health insurance benefits that do not provide 
retirement benefits. (For private employers, health insurance costs comprise 7.2% 
of total compensation, while retirement costs comprise 2.9% of total compensation). 
See EMPLOYMENT COST INDEXFS AND LEvELs, supra note 12, at 11. Retirement 
benefits clearly serve clifferent purposes from health insurance benefits, as retirement 
benefits are aimed at providing income to retired employees and their dependents, 
while health insurance benefits are aimed at protecting employees from unexpected 
financial loss caused by injury or illness to their families or themselves. Employee 
Benefits Handbook, supra note 11, at 1-2, 1-6, 33-5. Thus, a retirement allowance 
may be considered a benefit which is not related to health insurance. 
Even apart from the amendment discussed above, are the retirement allowance 
beneficiary provisions discriminatory in violation of Chapter 151B? The logic of 
Massachusetts Governor Weld's Executive Order 340 (discussed infra at text 
accompanying note 134) compels an affinnative answer. The Executive Order 
acknowledges the Commonwealth's obligations under Chapter 151B "to protect its 
citizens from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation," and directs the 
personnel department to promulgate such regulations "as are necessary to eliminate 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the benefits provided to 
employees under its jurisdiction." Executive Order 340, infra note 134. The Order 
goes on to provide a narrow list of benefits which are being extended, such as 
bereavement leave for an employee whose domestic partner or domestic partner's 
family member has died. If it is discriminatory to not allow an employee to take 
bereavement leave when his or her domestic partner dies, it is also discriminatory to 
not allow an employee to provide a retirement allowance to his or her domestic part­
ner when the employee dies. 
Some legal support may be found for arguing that the retirement allowance 
beneficiaryscheme is discriminatory, although such arguments have notgainedbroad 
approval. The Vermont Labor Relations Board in June 1993 ruled against the 
University of Vermont that the university violated its non-discrimination policies 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, by denying medical 
benefits to domestic partners of employe.es while extending benefits to spouses of 
employees. Grievance of: B.M., S.S., C.M., andJ.R., No. 92-30, at 214 (Vermont 
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The beneficiary provisions applicable to the Joint and Last Survivor 
Allowance and the Member Survivor Allowance were amended in 1991 
to permit a member to designate a "former spouse who has not 
remarried" as a beneficiary.90 This addition apparently was made in 
order to make it more practical to divide pensions in the context of 
domestic relations orders in divorce actions.91 This addition is 
significant because it expands the retirement allowance beneficiary 
provisions to include persons not related to members by blood or by 
marriage. It does not limit beneficiary choices to those aimed at 
supporting "traditional" families, i.e., a "former spouse" by definition is 
generally not part of the family unit (or he or she would not be a former 
spouse). It is also at odds with the provisions concerning the spouse of 
a member electing to receive the Member Survivor Allowance, which 
state that the allowance may be denied if the parties were not living 
together at the time of the member's death. 92 
It may be argued that the limited beneficiary choices ofthejoint and 
Last Survivor Allowance and the Member Survivor Allowance are 
appropriate because limiting the choices to relatives by blood and 
marriage (except for former spouses) allows the benefits to be targeted 
at dependents of employee-members. Indeed, it is an overriding goal of 
the retirement system to provide for the dependents of employee-mem-
Labor Relations Bd. 1993). The Vermont Labor Relations Board applied a disparate 
impact analysis based on Griggs v. Duke Power Co .• 401 U.S. 424, 4.31 (1971), stating 
that "[o]nce the employee demonstrates that the employer['s] practice causes a 
disparate impact on a protected class, the practice is prohibited unless the employer 
can demonstrate that the practice is related to job performance and [is] consistent 
with business necessity." Id. at 216. The Board found that excluding unmarried 
domestic partners ofemployees from health benefits had a "markedly disproportion­
ate impact on gay and lesbian employees compared. to heterosexual employees." Id. 
at 218. Finding no business necessity, the Board ordered the University to provide 
domestic partner benefits. Id. at 220-21. A similar disparate impact analysis was 
used in Anglin v. City of Minneapolis, Minneapolis Library Bd., No. 88180 EM-12 
(City of Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights 1992), to find that the city's failure to 
provide health benefits to same-sex partners of employees violated the city's ordi­
nance forbidding discrimination on the basis ofaffectional preference. Id. at 13. But 
see Phillips v. WISconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. 1991) (state's 
failure to provide health insurance benefits to partner of lesbian employee held not 
discriminatory on basis of sexual orientation or gender and not equal protection 
violation). Disparate impact analysis may be a promising approach to pursue in legal 
challenges to the retirement allowance beneficiary provisions. 
90. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12{2) Option (c) (1992). 
91. See Memorandum from John J . McGlynn, Commissioner of Division of 
Employee Retirement Administration, to All Retirement Boards (Apr. 24, 1991) (on 
file with author). · 
92. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). See infra text accompanying 
notes 124-32. · 
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bers.9' Upon close examination, however, it becomes clear that the 
retirement allowance beneficiary list is not about providing for 
dependents. A member could leave his or her pension to an adult 
millionaire sister, for example. Using a blood relationship as a surrogate 
for dependency determinations is not even rational. 94 
Moreover, although members may have actual dependents who do 
not fall within the allowed class, there is no latitude for case-by-case 
determinations in thls context. Indeed, the statutory list seems to be 
based on a concept of family that statistics show is becoming less and 
less common.95 Often, in today's two-earner households, relationships 
between adults are of interdependence, and not of one-way depen­
dence.96 If the goal of the retirement system is to promote caring for 
actual dependents, perhaps the retirement allowance beneficiary list 
should be changed by allowing the Board the discretion to determine 
whether a person with whom a member has a relationship is truly 
financially dependent. 97 
The retirement allowance beneficiary restrictions may be defended 
as a bright-line means of reflecting the emotional attachments of the 
m~ority ofmembers, and allows those members to provide for those to 
whom they are emotionally attached. Yet, the list may not accurately 
reflect the relationships of many members at all. Some people are 
estranged from their legally-recognized families and it would be highly 
unlikely that they would wish to provide a benefit to those families. If 
the goal is to allow members to designate as a beneficiary a person to 
whom they are emotionally attached, regardless of dependence, the list 
should be revised to permit the designation of persons beyond those 
currently listed. 
It may also be argued that the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance, 98 
which allows a member to provide to a beneficiary an allowance during 
the beneficiary's lifetime, is more expensive for the Commonwealth and 
should therefore be more limited than other options. This analysis is 
inaccurate, however, because the three options contained in section 
12(2)99 are actuarially e~ent,100 or designed to cost the public 
employer the same amount.101 For example, the amount received by 
93. See supra note 11 and a~companying text, and infra text accompanying note 
117. 
94. See infra note 112. 
95. See supra notes 1 and 4. 
96. BERGMANN, supra note 1, at 25-38. 
97. See infra note 122. 
98. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992). 
99. The Life Annuity Option. the Cash Refund Annuity Option, and theJoint 
and Last Survivor Allowance Option. 
100. MAss. Gl!'.N. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992). 
101. See supra note 65. 
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the employee and her beneficiary under the Joint and Last Survivor 
Allowance is adjusted according to the age of the employee and the age 
of the beneficiary to be actuarially equivalent to the Life Annuity 
option.102 Thus, there appears to be no fiscal justification for the 
beneficiary limitations on the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance. 
Next, it may be argued that the Commonwealth has an interest in 
promoting "traditional" nuclear families because such units are deemed 
the best setting in which to raise children.103 Even assuming this 
conclusion is correct, 104 the retirement allowance beneficiary list does 
not promote such families, since it includes adult siblings, ex-spouses, 
and parents who may not be involved in any way with the member's 
household unit or with child-rearing. 
The retirement statute arguably treats members who have responsibil­
ities and personal lives that do not fit within the statute and who wish to 
designate beneficiaries to reflect their responsibilities and lives, in a 
similar fashion to those who have been convicted of a "criminal offense 
involvi~g violation of the laws applicable to [their] office or posi­
tion."105 Employees convicted of such offenses can designate that 
return of contributions be made to a beneficiary of their choice, but 
forfeit any interest otherwise received.106 Such employees also forfeit 
their retirement allowance.107 Loyal employees, who have not been 
convicted of any offc:nse, and who wish to provide benefits to someone 
outside the rigid beneficiary list can only designate return of their own 
102. Thus, while a member may designate a very young beneficiary to receive the 
Joint and Last Survivor Allowance, the annual amount received by the beneficiary will 
be less than that which would be received by an older beneficiary. MAss. GEN. L. 
ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992). 
103. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently held in the context of 
adoption, that the "best interests of the child,. is the governing principle and that 
adoption by a lesbian co-parent of her partner's child is appropriate if in the best 
interests of the child. Adoption ofSusan, 416 Mass. 1003,1003, 619 N.E.2d 323,324 
(1993); Adoption ofTammy, 416 Mass. 205, 210.17, 619 N.E.2d 315, 318-21 (1993). 
104. Interestingly, the City of Boston's Executive Order entitled "Extension of 
Certain Personnel Benefits, .. February 12, 1993, indicates that the Cityhas an interest 
in promoting bonds within all types of families. It states: "The City recognizes that 
the welfare of all residents is enhanced by efforts to reinforce the bonds of families, 
both traditional and non-traditional, and encourages individuals to provide 
emotional, economic, and social support within households[.]" See infra text 
accompanying notes 135-36. 
105. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 12(2)(c), {d), 15(4) {1992). 
106. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 15 (4) (1992). 
107. Id. The statute does not define offenses pertaining to an employee's office. 
A prominent current case pertaining to this issue is MacLean v. State Bd. of 
Retirement, No. 93-33cv1203 (D. Mass. filed Oct. 12, 1993), in which former 
Massachusetts state representative William Q. MacLean is challenging theRetirement 
Board's decision terminating his retirement allowance because ofhis conviction on 
conflict of interest charges. · 
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contributions, plus interest, to a beneficiary.108 They cannot provide 
any of their retirement allowance to a person not listed in the statute. 
The primary difference is that the loyal employee is permitted to direct 
his or her other contributions plus interest to the recipient of his or her 
choosing, while the convicted employee is allowed to designate the 
recipient of his or her contributions only (without interest). 
Further, it is incongruous that a member may designate a former 
spouse to receive theJoint and Last Survivor's Allowance, while a gay or 
lesbian member in an intact, flourishing, long-term relationship cannot 
designate his or her partner to receive the allowance. Tills outcome 
contravenes principles of individual consideration of circumstances 
found elsewhere in the statute.109 
The limitations on choice of beneficiary also force those with 
responsibilities and personal lives that do not conform to the statute's 
structure to deny those connections, e.g., to take the full annuity 
allowance,110 or to provide minimal or no support to their loved 
one.111 The employee in a lifelong, but legally unrecognized, relation­
ship is denied the opportunity to take a lesser allowance during his or 
her lifetime in order to provide the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance 
to a partner.112 In sum, the retirement allowance beneficiary pro­
visions make very little, if any sense. They do not save the Common­
wealth money. They do not further any coherent goal. Their restric­
108. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 11(2) (1992). Note that this only applies if any 
employee dies before retirement; ifhe dies after retirement, the designated survivor 
only receives the remainder of the member's contributions, if any. MAss. GEN. L. 
ch. 32, § 12(2} Option (b) (1992). 
109. See infra text accompanying notes 116-32. 
110. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2} Option (a) (Ufe Annuity) (1992). See supra text 
accompanying note 51. 
111. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (b) (Cash Refund Annuity) (1992). See 
supra text accompanying notes 52-55, 62-63. 
112. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c) (1992). The retirement allowance 
beneficiary provisions. as discussed above. limit gay and lesbian employees' rights to 
provide for their partners or former partners while allowing married and divorced 
heterosexual employees to provide for their spouses or former spouses. Challenges 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and under Part 
I, article 10 of the Massachusetts Constitution are worth considering. Most courts 
have applied rational basis scrutiny to equal protection claims of lesbians and gay 
men. Patricia A. Cain, LitigatingfM Lesbian and Gay Rights. 79 VA. L. REv. 1551, 
1620 n.368 (1993). As the discussion supra at text accompanying notes 60-112 haS 
shown, the p rovisions are not reasonably tailored to any legitimate goal. They are 
not aimed at supporting members' family units (former spouses can be designated, 
see supra text accompanying notes 90-92), they are not aimed at supporting 
dependents ofmembers (non-dependent parents and siblings can be designated, see 
supra text accompanying notes 93-95), other persons who may be actual dependents 
cannot be designated (see supra text accompanying notes 95-97), and its limitations 
do not save the state any funds (see supra text accompanying notes 98-102). 
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tions prevent employees from providing for actual dependents and loved 
ones after their own deaths. 
IV. STATIITORY DEFINITIONS OF DESERVING SPOUSES 
In several portions of the retirement statute, discussed in this part, 
the marital status of a retirement system member is a critical factor in 
determining whether a surviving spouse is entitled to benefits, but it is 
not the sole determinant. Several sections provide that the surviving 
spouse of a deceased member may not be able to receive benefits if the 
spouse did not live with the member at the time of the member's death, 
remarries, or if "the Board finds that the spouse engaged in certain 
reprehensible conduct. ns The duration, nature, and state of the 
relationship at the time of the member's death is in some circumstances 
taken into account.114 Given that the statute considers the substance 
of the marital relationship in determining whether a surviving spouse 
receives certain benefits, it is inconsistent to deny all benefits to the 
surviving partners of gay, lesbian, or unmarried heterosexual members 
without considering the duration, nature, and state of their relation­
ships.115 
A. 	 Accidental Death Benefit 
The retirement statute provides for an accidental death benefit, 
which is neither a pension nor annuity benefit, for any memberwho dies 
as the result of a personal injury sustained or a hazard undergone while 
in the performance of official duties.116 This payment is made 
automatically according to the recipient scheme set forth in the statute; 
members do not designate beneficiaries in this context. The theme of 
providing for employees' dependents is most emphasized in the 
provisions pertaining to accidental death benefits.117 
The statute directs death benefits to be paid to a surviving spouse for 
as long as the spouse survives and does not remarry. To be eligible 
113. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, §§ 9 (2)(a), (b), 12(2) Option (d) (1992). See infra text 
accompanying notes 116-132. 
114. See infra text accompanying notes 116-32. 
115. See supra text accompanying notes 60-112, and infra text accompanying notes 
116-32. 
116. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(1), (2)(a) (1992). 
117. See supra text accompanying note 11, and supra text accompanying note 93. 
lbis is true in other New England states' retirement laws, where accidental death 
benefits generally go automatically to a surviving spouse, children, and other 
relatives. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws§ 36-10-20 {1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 100-A:S 
(1990); ME. .REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 18003 (West 1989). Vermont's public 
retirement statutes provision on accidental death benefits states it shall be paid to the 
"dependent beneficiary" or "dependent spouse" of the member, but it does not 
define the term "dependent." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 465 (a), (b) (1985). 
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under this provision, however, the couple must have been living 
together118 at the time of the member's death for the surviving spouse 
to receive the allowance.119 Alternatively, the spouse may receive the 
benefit if the Board finds that the couple had been living apart at the 
time of the member's death because of the member's desertion of such 
spouse.120 Given these beneficiary provisions, it is puzzling that the 
statute forces a benefit to be paid to a surviving spouse who the member 
abandoned, since the member would presumably not want the survivor 
to receive any benefits.121 The benefit also terminates upon remarriage 
and is thus based on the assumption that marriage involves support and 
that a remarried spouse no longer needs or deserves such support.122 
If the couple was living apart at the time of the member's death because 
the spouse had abandoned the member, presumably the spouse would 
118. For discussion of what constitutes "living together" for purposes of Mas­
sachusetts General Law Chapter 32, § 12{2)(d), see Donnelly v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeals Bd., 15 Mass. App. CL 19, 443 N .E.2d 416 (1982), discussed infra 
note 126. 
119. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(2)(a), (b) (1992). 
120. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(2)(a) (1992). 
121. This illustrates the dominance of the concept of dependence in this section 
of the statute. For, even if the member had deserted the spouse because the spouse 
was engaging in moral turpitude, orfor some other "justifiable cause," the accidental 
death benefits are paid to the spouse. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d), 
and infra text accompanying notes 112-13 (1992). The statute assumes the spouse 
is dependent on the member and therefore worthy of supporL 
122. Underscoring the equation of marriage with support is the provision 
pertaining to disposition of the benefits if there is no eligible swviving spouse. In 
such instances, the benefit is paid to a guardian for the benefit ofany children who 
are under eighteen years ofage and unmarried or who were over eighteen and inca­
pacitated from earning on the date of the member's death. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, 
§ 9(2)(b) (1992). It should be noted that permission of the probate court and the 
parent or guardian of a minor wishing to marry is necessary before a minor is 
permitted to marry. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 207 §§ 25, 33 (1992). Section 9(b) means 
that ifa surviving child under eighteen marries, the benefit terminates. Once a child 
is over eighteen, the benefit terminates whether the individual is married or not. 
The benefit provisions continue for a variety of situations. If there is no eligible 
surviving spouse or child, it shall be paid to the: 
surviving totally dependent father or mother of such member ...then to any 
totally dependent unmarried orwidowed sister ofsuch member with whom 
he was living at the time of his death, so long as such beneficiary or 
beneficiaries survive, do not marry or remarry, and are unable to support 
themselves. 
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(c) (1992). 

The board is to decide all questions relating to dependency. MAss. GEN. L ch. 32, 

§ 9(3)(a) (1992). While the provision does not even contemplate the possibility that 

a brother could be totally dependent, the statute has been construed to allow benefits 

to a totally dependent brother. Flanagan v. Dedham Retirement Board, Division of 

Administrative Law Appeals, No. 8995 (Mar. 13, 1986) (on flle with author). 
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not receive the benefit.w The accidental death benefits provisions are 
an example ofmarriage used as a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for payment of benefits to the surviving spouse of an employee. as 
various conditions must be satisfied before payment is made. 
B. Member Survivor Allowance 
The "Member Survivor Allowance," previously discussed, 124 allows 
the surviving spouse of a member who dies before retirement to elect to 
receive a survivor's share amounting to two-thirds of the member's re­
tirement allowance ifthe member had not designated a beneficiary other 
than the spouse. 125 · To receive this allowance, however, the spouse 
must have been married to the member for more than a year and the 
couple must have been living together at the time of death.126 If they 
were living apart, the Board must find that they were living apart for 
"justifiable cause other than desertion or moral turpitude on the part of 
the [surviving] spouse" in order to award these benefits.127 
This provision also illustrates the use of marriage as an important, 
but not exclusive, factor in the allocation ofbenefits. The one-year rule 
123. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(2)(a) (1992). 
124. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41, 4345; supra chart accompanying 
notes 66-75. 
125. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). Section 12(B) also provides 
for an allowance where a member who has two years creditable service under the 
circumstances in which a surviving spouse can elect to receive a survivors' allowance, 
see supra note 40 and infra text accompanying notes 126-32, and an additional 
allowance is paid to the surviving spouse for the benefit of the children. MAss. GEN. 
L . ch. 32, § 12B (1992). The couple must have been living together at the time of 
death, and if living apart the cause must not be moral turpitude of the surviving 
spouse. Id. 
126. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d), 12B (1992). See Donnelly v. 
Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd., 15 Mass. App. CL 19, 443 N.E.2d 416 (1982). 
In DonneUy, the Appeals Court held that a husband and wife were "living together" 
at the time of the member-wife's death, so that the husband was entitled to claim the 
allowance. overturning the Board's determination that they had not been "living 
together" under the statute, and overriding the wife's choice of her children as 
named beneficiaries ofher contributions. Id. at 24, 443 N .E.2d at 419. At the time 
of the member-wife's death by suicide, the husband was out of town on a short trip, 
and the wife had begun moving out of the house but was prevented from doing so 
completely by a storm. Id. at 21, 443 N.E.2d at 417. Where the parties had not 
established separate residences, the court held that they were living together at the 
time of the wife's death. Id. at 21-24, 443 N.E.2d at 417-19. The consequence was 
that the children were denied the return of their mother's contribution and the 
husband received the Member Survivor Allowance. Id. at 19, 443 N.E.2d at 419. 
127. MAsS. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(d) (1992). See infra notes 128-31. The emphasis 
on desertion is interesting in view of the concomitant emphasis elsewhere in the 
statute on dependence. See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 9(a) (Accidental Death Benefits) 
(1992). See supra text accompanying notes 116-23. Moral turpitude, however, seems 
not to be related to dependence. See infra text accompanying notes 128-30. 
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forbidding the spouse from electing to receive benefits if the parties 
were manied less than a year ensures that a couple will not marry at the 
last minute before a member dies so that benefits can be passed on to 
a "sham" spouse. 
Moreover, if the parties bad been married for twenty years but were 
living apart at the time ofdeath, the surviving spouse will not necessarily 
receive the allowance. In such circumstances, the survivor does not 
automatically receive the allowance, but can only receive it if the Board 
finds that, although they were living apart, the survivor did not desert 
the member or engage in moral turpitude,128 and the separation was 
justifiable.129 This seems to have the purpose of insuring that a non­
deserving spouse, e.g., a spouse who had deserted the innocent member, 
should not receive the benefit. Similarly, where a separation was 
precipitated by the survivor's moral t;:r:Ritude, the survivor should not 
be able to elect to receive the benefit. so Only if a separation is for 
'justifiable cause," as determined by the Board, 151 can a surviving 
spouse manied to a deceased member for more than one year elect to 
receive the benefit. The statute thus "weeds out" the undeserving 
surviving spouse, rather than making the bright-line legal issue of 
marria~e the only factor relevant in being able to elect to receive the 
share.1 
128. There is no dear definition of "moral turpitude" under MassachUsetts law. 
In Essex County Retirement Bd.. v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd., 342 Mass. 
322, 324, 173 N.E.2d 627, 629 (1961}, the court assumed that bribery and larceny 
constituted moral turpitude. The term has interesting connotations: In Nemetz v. 
INS, 485 F. Supp. 470 (E.D.Va. 1980), a district court found that an immigrant's 
involvement in a long·tenn homosexual relationship constituted moral turpitude and 
demonstrated the immigrant's bad moral character so as to mandate his exclusion. 
This finding was reversed on appeal. Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1981). 
The phrase recurs in the context ofwhether a surviving spouse can elect to receive 
a survivor's allowance; if the spouses are living apart because of moral turpitude on 
the part of the survivor, the survivor cannot receive the allowance. MAss. GEN. L 
ch. 32, §§ 12(2) Option (d), 12B (1992). 
129. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12 Option (d) (1992). 
130. The "moral turpitude" phrase is repeated in MAss. GEN. L ch. 32, § 10. See 
supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
131. According to the Dtmnelly Court, "justifiable cause" is a "tenn of art" in 
domestic relations law. Donnelly v. Contributory Retirement Appeals Bd., 15 Mass. 
App. Ct. 19, 22, 443 N.E.2d 416, 418 (1982). 
132. This "weeding out" is similar to, although broader than, the spouse's forced 
share in the context ofwills, where a court may make a determination, prior to the 
death of the decedent, that will prohibit a spouse from claiming a forced share. See 
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 191, § 15 (1992} & MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209, § 36 (1992) (providing 
that a probate court may enter a judgment that a person has been deserted by his 
or her spouse or is living apart from such person's spouse for justifiable cause, and 
in such an instance the surviving spouse may not claim a forced share). 
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V. PROPOSAlS FOR CHANGE 
A. Introduction 
This article has described the rigid statutory limitations on retirement 
allowance beneficiaries and discussed several scenarios in which such 
limitations may deny deserving members the opportunity to designate as 
beneficiaries those to whom they are responsible and emotionally 
attached. This article has also contrasted the rigid rules pertaining to 
designating beneficiaries with other provisions of the retirement statute. 
These other provisions, such as accidental death benefits, embody the 
ideas that rigid categories such as marital status should not be the sole 
criterion on which to base entitlement to retirement benefits and that 
other factors, such as emotional and financial dependence and the 
nature of the subject relationship, should be important in certain 
contexts. Similarly, entitlement to a portion ofan employee's retirement 
allowance should not tum. solely on marital status, which can deny loyal 
employees opportunities they have earned. Rather, the statute should 
be revised to more fairly and accurately reflect the realities of the diverse 
families of public employees. 
This article will now propose several simple changes in the statute 
which would make it more consistent and fair to all employees. The 
changes proposed will not significantly increase costs or administrative 
burdens on the Commonwealth. 
B. Specific Proposals 
1. 	 Allowing a Member to Designate His or Her Domestic Partner as 
a Recipient of theJoint and Last Survivor and Member Survivor 
Allowance 
The beneficiary provisions for the Joint and Last Survivor and 
Member Survivor Allowances beneficiary list should be amended to 
reflect the values of both supporting dependents of members and 
enabling members to provide support for those to whom they are 
emotionally attached. 133 To accomplish this goal, each member should 
133. One possibility for change would be to eliminate the limitations of sections 
12 Option (c) and 12 Option (d) on designation of beneficiaries for survivor 
allowances. This would allow a member to designate anyone as a beneficiary. As 
discussed in notes 14 and 76 above, the other New England states do not contain 
comparable limitations onbeneficiaries, and employees can designate whomever they 
wish to re{;eive retirement benefits afrer their deaths. Sin~ the various options are 
acwarially equivalent. it can be argued that it should not matter at all who {;3D be 
beneficiaries. The administrative simplicity of eliminating limitations on who can 
receive the Option (c) allowance is very appealing. However, such an amendment 
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have the option ofdesignating a "domestic partner" to receive his or her 
survivor's benefits. 
Both public and private employers are increasingly providing some 
of the same employment benefits to "domestic partners" of employees 
that they provide to legal spouses. Massachusetts Governor William 
Weld, in a 1992 Executive Order, extended the benefits ofbereavement 
and sick leave for state employees in a "relationship ofmutual support" 
with another person so that an employee whose domestic partner had 
died could take off time from work.1M In 1993, former City of Boston 
would not reduce the inequities regarding the Member Survivor Allowance or 
Accidental Death Allowance, and a domestic partner requirement could do so. 
134. Exec. Order No. 340, reprinted in Report to Governor, Governor Weld's 
Executive Order 340, entitled "Providing for Non-Discriminatory Benefit Policies for 
Employees of the Commonwealth," provides as follows: 
Whereas, Chapter 151B of the Massachusetts General Law established the 
obligation of the Commonwealth to protect its citizens from discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation; and Whereas, the Commonwealth 
recognizes its responsibility to take measures to ensure that its official 
employment policies are in hannony with the established obligations of 
Chapter 151B; Now, Therefore, I .. . do hereby order as follows: 
1. For purposes of this executive order, "relationship ofmutual 
support" means a relationship between two individuals, each 
unmarried and competent to contract, characterized by mutual 
caring and emotional support; an agreement to share basic living 
expenses; a sharing of living quarters and an intent to do so 
indefinitely; a mutualassumption ofresponsibility for each other's 
welfare; and a mutual expectation that the relationship is exclusive 
and will endure over time. 
2. The Department ofPersonnel Administration shall, no later 
than November 1, 1992, promulgate such regulations and policies 
as are necessary to eliminate discrimination on the basis ofsexual 
orientation in the benefits provided to employees under its 
· jurisdiction. Benefits shall include the following: 
a. An employee of the Commonwealth shall be 
entitled to a maximum of four calendar days of paid 
"bereavement" leave, upon the death ofa family member 
or of a person with whom the employee has a relation­
ship of mutual support. 
b. An employee of the Commonwealth shall be 
allowed to use up to 10 days of accrued sick leave in the 
event of the serious illness of a family member or of a 
person with whom the employee has a relationship of 
mutual support. 
3. An employee of the Commonwealth claiming leave benefits 
on account of the illness or death of a person with whom the 
employee has a relationship of mutual support must, as a 
condition of receiving such leave benefits, certify to the Depart­
ment ofPersonnel Administration the existence ofhis or her rela­
tionship of mutual support . 
Id. 
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Mayor Raymond Flynn extended certain personnel benefits to "domestic 
partners and other household members" of city of Boston employ­
ees.185 The cities of Cambridge and Brookline have each passed 
domestic partnership ordinances within the last year.136 Also within 
the last year, Clark University, Harvard University, the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, and Wellesley College have all put in place 
domestic partnership policies that provide a range of benefits to 
domestic partners of employees.187 
Numerous entities, including a federal agency {the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development),188 various municipalities, 139 one 
state \Dlinois),140 and many private companies, including Levi­
Strauss 41 and Lotus Development, 142 have instituted some types of 
135. Boston Mayor Raymond L Flynn, Executive Order, Extension of Certain 
Personnel Benefits (Feb. 12, 1993). The executive order did not define "domestic 
partners", but included "domestic partners" in the definition of "household 
members." Id. 1I 1. "Household members" was defined simply as persons who 
currently reside in the household of a city employee and have shared their principal 
domicile for not less than the past year with a City employee. Id. The order extend­
ed sick, bereavement and family leave to household members ofcity employees and 
directedcertain city agencies to explore appropriate familyandmedical leave policies 
to address all provisions of the executive order. 
136. Christopher Mutler,Brookline AdoptsDomestic PartnersProposal, BAYWINDOWS, 
June 10, 1993, at 1; CAMBRIDGE, MAss., MUN. CODE ch. 2, § 119 (1992); Town of 
Brookline, Final Vote to Amend the Town ByLaws (June 2, 1993) (on file with 
author). 
137. Clark University, Proposed Policy for Extension of Benefits to Domestic 
Partners not Legally Allowed to Marry under Massachusetts Law (Apr. 1993) (on file 
with author); Memorandum fromJoan F. ruce, Director ofPersonnel, Massachusetts 
Institute ofTechnology, to Members of the MIT Community (Apr. 28, 1993) (on file 
With author); Memorandum from Molly Ambrose Ostwald, Director of Personnel, 
Wellesley College, to Members of the Wellesley College Faculty and Staff (June 7, 
1993) (on file with author). See Jordanna Hart, Benefits at Harvard to cover gay 
partners, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 1993, at 17. 
138. Legisl4tive & Political Updates, LEsBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, Apr. 1993, a t 26 
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development puts into effect a domestic 
partner family leave program). 
139. See, e.g., Legisl4tive Updates, LEsBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, Nov. 1992, at 79 
(Sacramento adopts domestic partner registration ordinance); LEsBIAN/GAY LAw 
NOTES, june 1993, at 63 (Minneapolis}. See infra note 143. 
140. Legisl4tive Updates, LEsBIAN/GAY LAw Non:s, Nov. 1991, at 49 ("Dlinois 
Senate has passed a bill allmving hospital patients to designate whom they won't 
allow to visit them, a sort ofmini-domestic partner bill."). 
141. Leui Strauss, Princeton, Join Dtmu!Stic Partnership R.anks, LEsBIAN/ GAY LAw 
NOTES, Apr. 1992, at 29. 
142. Domestic Partnership Cause Advancer, WBIAN/GAY LAw Non:s, Oct. 1991, at 
67 {Lotus will offer health and .other benefit coverage to domestic partners of gay 
employees). 
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domestic partnership benefit policies.14 ! While it does not appear that 
domestic partnership principles have yet been applied to any retirement 
systems, it is unclear whether such a proposal has been made. 144 
Massachusetts thus has an opportunity to be a national leader in this 
area. 
Governor Weld's Executive Order 340 defines a "relationship of 
mutual support" in a manner that could be applied in other contexts 
with slight modifications. The order defines a "relationship of mutual 
support" as, "[a] a relationship between two individuals. [b) each 
unmarried and competent to contract; [c) characterized by mutual caring 
and emotional support; [ d] an agreement to share basic living expenses; 
[e] a sharing of living quarters and an intent to do so indefinitely; [f] a 
mutual assumption of responsibility for each other's welfare; and [g) a 
mutual ~ectation that the relationship is exclusive andwill endure over 
time. "145 The existing policy is administered by the Department of 
Personnel Administration, which has prepared a form entitled "Certifica­
tion of Relationship of Mutual Support" which repeats the above 
definition and leaves blanks for the employee to verify that he or she is 
"committed to a relationship ofmutual support under the terms ofExec­
utive Order 340. "146 
The retirement statute should be amended to provide for members 
to designate a "domestic partner" or "person with whom said member 
is in a relationship of mutual support" to receive benefits under the 
143. See Craig A. Bowman & Blake Cornish, A More Perfta Union: A Legal and 
Social Ana0'sis' ofDomestic Partner Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1164 (1992); Elbin, 
supra note 5, at 1068. In Berkeley, California, believed to be the first city to extend 
health plan benefits to domestic partners, unmarried couples must file an Affidavit 
ofDomestic Partnership stating that they have lived together for at least six months 
and "share common necessities of life... Id. at 1072. In Santa Cruz, California, which 
also ·extends health benefits ·to domestic partners, the policy states that if the 
employer or company suffers any loss because ofa false statement in an Affidavit of 
Domestic Parmership, the employer or company may sue for their losses. including 
attorneys fees. ld. at 1073. The Santa Cruz policy also provides that the persons 
must be at least eighteen and not related close by blood than would prevent them 
from marrying in California. Id. Some private employers' domestic parmership 
policies, e.g., that of Lotus Development, have applied only to gay and lesbian 
employees, based on the reasoning that heterosexual employees can get married and 
take advantage of spousal benefits while gay or lesbian employees cannot. All 
governmental domestic partnership policies ofwhich this writer is aware, apply to all 
employees regardless of sexual orientation. 
144. In researching this article, the authorbas found no published articles pertain­
ing to this issue. 
145. Exec. Order No. 340, supra note 134, 1 1. 
146. Memorandum from Robert C. Dumont, Personnel Administrator to Cabinet 
Secretaries and Agency Heads. Oct. 30, 1992 (on file with author). The form is 
identified as confidential. It does not name the person with whom the employee is 
in a Relationship ofMutual Support. See id. 
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Member Survivor Allowance if the employee dies before retirement,147 
and the Joint and Last Survivor Allowance if the employee dies after 
retirement.148 The operable requirements could contain the elements 
in Governor Weld's definition: (1) the member must be unmarried and 
in a relationship with an individual who is unmarried; (2) the member 
and the person with whom he is in a relationship must be competent to 
contract; (3) the relationship must be characterized by mutual caring and 
emotional support; ( 4) the persons in the relationship must have agreed 
to share basic living expenses; (5) the persons in the relationship must 
be living together and intend to do so indefinitely; (6) they must 
mutually assume responsibility for each other's welfare; and (7) they 
must mutually expect that the relationship is exclusive and will endure 
over time.149 
Members seeking to designate a beneficiary under the amended 
provision could be required to execute an affidavit attesting to the above 
elements of the relationship.150 The affidavit would be kept confiden­
tial151 and should name the domestic partner, as it is after all a desig­
nation of beneficiary form. If the designation is later challenged, the 
Board will determine the validity of the designation. As this article has 
shown, the retirement statute already provides for numerous situations 
in which the Board may have to make factual determinations, 152 so a 
new responsibility should not be a significant burden on the Board. 
147. MAss. GEN. L . ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). 
148. Id. ~ 
149. See Exec. Order No. 340, supra note 134. 
150. It shouldbe noted that this involves a significantly greater degree ofintrusion 
into the relationship of the individuals involved than is currently the case under the 
joint and Last Survivor Allowance of§ 12(2) Option (c). For example, if a person 
designates his spouse to receive survivor benefits under Option (c), the spouse 
automatically can receive the benefits regardless of whether the parties even live 
together or whether the parties' relationship is characterized by mutual support and 
caring, or whether the relationship is exclusive. See Mary Ann Case, Couples and 
Coupling in the Public Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History ofLitigating for Lesbian 
and Gay R ights, 79 VA. L. REv. 1643, 1664-66 (1993). In addition, the affidavit would 
give local retirement boards significant private information about members. nus is 
an argument for simply eliminating all limitations on choice of beneficiaries for 
section 12(2) Option (c). See supra note 133. 
151. Anysuch affidavitwould containpersonal dataand should be protected from 
disclosure under the public records law. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 4 , § 2 (cl. 26(c)) (1992). 
However, complete protection of the material would be difficult to ensure. 
152. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(d) (1992). Under this provision, for 
example, if a member has not designated a spouse as a beneficiary, the spouse and 
member were not living together at the time of the member's death, and the spouse 
elects to obtain survivor benefits, the Board decides if the separation was justifiable 
or not. Under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 32, § 9(3)(a) (1992), the Board 
would decide whether a widowed sister who lived with a member who died from an 
accident at work, is totally dependent upon him. See id. § 12(2)( d). See supra note 
122. 
- -. .. .. .......... .. ... . . . . ... ... -.. ... 
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While Governor Weld's Executive Order does not deal with 
situations in which a domestic partnership has ended, other policies have 
dealt with that issue. The University of Chicago, which provides health 
coverage and other benefits for domestic partners, 155 uses a form enti­
tled "Statement of Tennination of Domestic Partnership" which treats 
such a termination as equivalent to a divorce, terminating items such as 
library privileges but allowing the ex-domestic partner to continue health 
insurance benefits for thirty-six months after termination. 154 In the 
retirement context, a similar form could be drafted that would terminate 
the designation of the beneficiary. 155 
These provisions would establish a clear standard for determining 
whether a person with whom a member lived and had a relationship was 
the member's "domestic partner." The Board would not be required to 
become involved in individual determinations except in extraordinary 
circumstances. 
It should be emphasized that this statutory change should not cost 
the Commonwealth any additional funds because all of the options 
153. The University of Chicago, Personnel Policy Guidelines, § U401.01 Uan. 11, 
1993) (on file with author). 
The University of Chicago defines "domestic partnership .. as: 
two individuals of the same gender who live together in a long-term 
relationship of indefinite duration, with an exclusive mutual commitment 
in which the Partners agree to be jointly responsible for each other's 
common welfare and share financial obligations. The Partners may not be 
related by blood to a degree of closeness which would prohibit legal mar­
riage in the state in which they legally reside. 
University ofChicago, Office ofStaffBenefits, Questions and Answers for Domestic 
Partnerships Uan. 15, 1993) (on file with author). The University requires both 
members of the domestic partnership to sign a statement certifying that they fall 
within the above definition. In the section where the partners certify that they are 
jointly responsible for each other's common welfare and share obligations, the 
statement provides that such joint responsibility: 
may be demonstrated by the existence of three of the following. We have 
circled below the types ofdocumentation that we can provide if requested. 
[a] Domestic Partnership Agreement[;] [b) Joint mortgage or lease[;] [c) 
Designation of domestic partner as beneficiary for life insurance and 
retirement contract[;] [ d] Designation of domestic partner as primary 
beneficiary in ... will[;] [e] Durable property and health care powers of 
attorney[;] [£]Joint ownership ofmotor vehicle, joint checking account, or 
joint credit account. 
University of Chicago, Office of Staff Benefits, Statement of Domestic Partnership, 
Questions and Answers on Domestic Partnerships (Jan. 15 1993) (on file with 
author). 
154. Id. f 4. 
155. If a member had informed the Board that the relationship was over, the 
fonner domestic partner could .not claim the Member-Survivor Allowance under 
section 12(2) Option {d). See supra text accompanying notes 40, 124-32. 
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under section 12(b) are actuarially equivalent.156 Employees who 
currently have "domestic partners" have simply been forced to choose 
other options basically equivalent in cost to the state.157 
2. 	 Allowing a Domestic Partner to Elect the Receive the Member 
Survivor Allowance in the Same Circumstances in which a Spouse 
May Do So 
The current retirement statute provides that a member's surviving 
spouse can elect to receive the Member Survivor Allowance, so long as 
the member has not already designated someone else and certain other 
requirements are met.158 Given the proposed requirements for do­
mestic partnership, a domestic partner should be able to elect to receive 
a survivor's allowance-as long as the member has not designated 
someone else. This latter supposition, however, could create the 
administrative problem of a person or persons claiming, after a 
member's death, to have been the domestic partner of the deceased 
employee. This benefit perhaps should not be implemented until the 
proposed changes to retirement allowance beneficiary provisions are in 
effect for some time. Perhaps regulations could be promulgated that 
establish what a person claiming the benefit would need to prove in 
order to prevail. Examples might include registration as a domestic part­
ner with the decedent under a local ordinance, joint ownership ofassets, 
and other factors.159 If the parties were living together at the time of 
the member's death, and the survivor can establish that he or she was 
the domestic partner of the decedent, then the partner should be able 
to elect to obtain the benefit. If the parties were not living together at 
the time of the member's death, the Board must find that they were 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 65, 98-102. . 
157. Because principles of fairness are involved, the fact that this proposal might 
cost the Commonwealth slightly more to administer the retirement system by 
including domestic partnership survivor allowances should not be fatal. See Report 
from Stanford University's Subcommittee on Domestic Partners' Benefits, June 1992, 
§ 3 (on file with author). 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 40, 124-32. The requirements include that 
the spouse and member must have been manied for at least a year and must have 
been living together at the time of the member's death. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, 
§§ 12(2)(c), 12B {1992). If they were not living together at the time of the member's 
death, the Board must conclude that they had been living apart for ':justifiable cause 
other than desertion or moral turpitude on the part of the [surviving] spouse" for 
the benefits to be provided. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(d) {1992). 
159. For example, the University of Chicago policy discussed above contains a list 
ofa number of objective criteria designed to determine the existence ofa domestic 
partnership, such as joint property ownership, designation of each other as primary 
beneficiary in wills, designation ofeach other as power ofattorney, and so forth. See 
supra note 153. · 
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living apart for a justifiable cause other than desertion on the part of the 
surviving domestic partner.160 
3. 	 Allow Domestic Partners to Receive Accidental Death Benefits in 
the Same Circumstances in Which Spouses May Receive Such 
Benefits 
Given the requirements for a relationship to be considered a 
domestic partnership as outlined above, it is reasonable to apply 
generally the same standards to the receipt of accidental death benefits 
by spouses as by domestic partners.161 This is particularly true when 
one considers that the definition of domestic partner contained in this 
article is more closely tailored to that of a relationship of actual depen­
dence or interdependence than that contained in the existing statute. 
A spousal relationship does not necessarily include all of the elements 
required for a nonspousal couple to meet the definition of "domestic 
partner.''162 The benefits would be paid to the surviving spouse or 
domestic partner who had been designated as the beneficiary under the 
Joint and Last Survivor and Member Survivor Allowance provisions. 
That person would receive the benefits provided that the couple had 
been living together at the time of the member's death, or if the Board 
finds that the couple had been not living together at the time of the me­
mber's death due to the desertion of such domestic partner by the 
member.163 The benefit could be extended to an individual designated 
by a member before death as a domestic partner and eventually to a per­
son who could establish the existence of a domestic partnership at the 
time of death.164 The benefit should terminate if a surviving domestic 
160. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (d) (1992). See supra text accompanying 
notes 126-30. This provision should not involve the Board in burdensome factual 
detenninations any more than the existing statute does, in circumstances where the 
member has not designated anyone, the couple was living apart, and the surviving 
member of the couple claims to be entitled to the allowance. See supra text 
accompanying notes 125-28. It is not suggested that the phrase "moral turpitude" 
be included in these amendments, indeed perhaps it should not be included in the 
statute. As noted above, the statute contains several contexts in which the phrase 
"moral turpitude" appears, but nowhere is the term defined. 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 116-23. 
162. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51. 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 116-23. 
164. Generally, an employeewho has a domestic partnerand wishes to provide for 
him or her will hopefully fill out the appropriate beneficiary form. In the context 
of "accidental death benefits," which are paid automatically to the member's spouse 
if they were living together, § 9(1), even if the member had not filled out any benefi­
ciary form under § 12(2) Option (c), it is important to provide the opportunity for 
a surviving domestic partner to establish the existence of the relationship for 
pwposes of the accidental death provisions since no opportunity for automatic 
payment of the benefit exists. Perhaps the statute instead should allow employees 
to select a beneficiary for these benefits. 
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partner enters a new relationship in the nature of a domestic partner­
ship, iust as the benefit terminates when a surviving spouse remar­
ries.16~ 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The retirement statute contains rules which are in certain respects 
too rigid to apply fairly to all of the Commonwealth's public employees 
and their families. For example, the system contains strict restrictions 
on who an employee may designate as a beneficiary of his or her retire­
ment allowance, limiting it to certain specific relatives, re~dless of the 
closeness or lack of closeness in the actual relationship. 66 Moreover, 
the actual relationship of the parties can limit benefits, e.g., the Member 
Survivor Allowance cannot be claimed by a surviving spouse who 
deserted the deceased spouse. 167 Thus, in some respects, the retire­
ment system reflects the fact that simple "bright line" familial relation­
ships such as marriage may not always be sufficient to determine fairly 
who should receive benefits. At the same time, the system unjustifiably 
places limitations on who an employee can designate as a beneficiary, in 
disregard of the actual nature of relationships, which may be just as 
intimate and involve as much financial dependence as relationships 
within a legally recognized family. 
Certain amendments could and should be made in the retirement 
statute to create a clear category of "domestic partner" for employee­
members.168 This provision would allow members to designate a 
person who could receive the portion of their pension available to 
designated surviving family members under theJoint and Last Survivor 
and Member Survivor beneficiary provisions.169 A designated domestic 
partner should also be able to receive accidental death benefits.170 The 
designation of "domestic partner" should not involve the Board or the 
courts in any more case-by-case determinations about member's rela­
tionships than the existing statute already requires. ~71 
165. See supra text accompanying note 130. While enforcement of this rule could 
bedifficult for domestic partners, enforcementofthe lose-benefits·if-you·remarryrule 
must be difficult too, because how will the Commonwealth know that a surviving 
spouse has remarried? Presumably receipt of surviving spouse accidental death 
benefits is conditioned upon the recipient's agreement to inform the Board if she 
remarries and provides for forfeiture ifshe does not so inform the Board. This rule 
could be extended to recipients of domestic partner accidental death benefits. 
166. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2) Option (c), Option (d) (1992). 
167. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 32, § 12(2)(d) (1992). 
168. See supra text accompanying notes 147-52. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 147-52, 158-60. 
170. See supra text accompanying notes 161-65. 
171. See supra text accompanying note 126. See also Donnelly v. Contributory 
Retirement Appeals Bd.• 15 Mass. App. Ct. 19, 443 N.E.2d 416 (1982). discussed 
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These changes should not result in a significant monetary burden on 
the Commonwealth, since the retirement allowance options under 
section 12(2), Chapter 32 of the Massachusetts General Laws are all 
actuarially equivalent. 172 The proposed changes would not be difficult 
to administer, and indeed are in many respects similar to systems already 
operating in other contexts.m The proposed changes provide a 
practical opportunity to improve further the retirement system and to 
remedy the inequities it unfortunately still promotes.174 
supra note 116. The rarity of reported cases on issues such as whether parties were 
"living together" suggests that litigation on such issues is relatively infrequent. 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65. 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 134:43. 
174. See supra text accompanying notes 133-65. 
